English-only policies are acceptable if they are related to safety concerns. Otherwise, they are generally viewed by most courts as evidence of discrimination. English-only policies are also rare as hen’s teeth in San Antonio. Yet, according to a recently filed lawsuit, La Cantera imposed an English-only work rule for its workers. But, if the allegations are to be believed, the policy only applied to Spanish speakers. Farsi  speakers could speak in Farsi at work.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed suit against La Cantera alleging the resort imposed the policy and then fired some employees when they violated the new rule. One worker of 12 years was fired after he complained about the rule against speaking Spanish. One worker who spoke Spanish at an orientation meeting was escorted rom the room after he spoke Spanish.

One supervisor poked fun at a Spanish accent. One worker was fired with a notation in his personnel file that he spoke Spanish while using his personal cell phone.

In October, 2014, a worker went to Human Resources to complain and was told, “This is America, so speak English! What’s the problem?” When even HR does not see a problem with that sort of rule, then the employer has a serious problem. See the San Antonio Express News report here. And, imposing a rule like that in the San Antonio area suggests management is simply tone deaf.

Why is it so hard to speak up at a toxic work culture? The Harvard Business Review described what occurred at Nike when some women informally surveyed other female employees and found a problem. As a result, top male executives are having and bias training has ben instituted. The real problem started long before those women started their own survey. It started when some female em-loyees went to Human Resources and found no assistance.

As the HBR article points out, is is hard to challenge the status quo. Some workers see abuse occurring, but believe it is not their place to intervene. Or, they fear the consequences of intervening. In one study, actors played a man harassing a female worker. In the first scenario, the male actor was smaller and less threatening in his appearance. If a bystander was present, 50% of observers would help. If there was no bystander, only 5.9% of participants would help the woman. When the male actor was larger and more fierce looking, the numbers dropped considerably.

When I was in the Army, every Army unit took a “climate survey” every few years. The survey asked on an anonymous basis how the soldiers viewed the leadership. But, after a few years in the military, I did not need a survey. I felt I could visit a unit and know within minutes whether the climate was good or bad. If soldiers would talk to me as a captain or major who they had never met, then I knew the unit was functional. But, if the subordinate soldiers avoided engaging me in conversation, then I knew these were soldiers who did not believe they were supported by their chain of command. They feared to make a mistake.

People in general are more likely to conform to certain behavior if they know others were also conforming. For example, one study found that hotel guests were more likely to re-use their towels if they knew that most guests re-used their towels – as opposed to otherwise simply hearing a message about protecting the environment. The level of re-use rose 26% if the guest knew other hotel guests had also re-used their towels. And, if the guests knew that the very persons who had been in that same room also re-used their towels, they were 33% more likely to re-use their towels. That is the power of following behavior displayed by others.

Yes, but what happens in a hierarchical situation? What happens when persons outrank other persons? That is the employment situation. In the Army, the message was clear: the leader must set the example. The HBR article makes the point that organizations need to covey a message that some behaviors will not be tolerated. In doing so, the mistreated persons will find their voice. Yes indeed. See the Harvard Business Review article, “Why Its So hard to Speak Up Against a Toxic Culture” here.

One huge problem with Pres. Trump is his apparent inability to tell the truth. Bob Woodward’s book recounts the story that to prepare the President to be interviewed by Robert Mueller, his attorney staged a mock interview. John Dowd wanted to prepare his client, so he put together a mock interview. The President could not get through without telling some obvious lies, according to the book. Mr. Dowd was quite frustrated. Not the least because as a lawyer, his license is at risk if he allows a client to testify about lies. It violates ethical rules in every state for a lawyer to knowingly allow a client to tell a falsehood.

Andrew Hall discusses this dilemma regarding Mr. Dowd. Andrew Hall once represented John Erlichman, the former Watergate defendant. As Hall points out, any attorney who represents the President knowing he will lie or might lie puts his license at risk. See The Hill report here. That risk may explain why John Dowd resigned form the President’s defense last March. What many of us have forgotten is that after Watergate, many lawyers lost their licenses to practice law.

That was an unwise decision by the U.S. Supreme Court a few weeks ago. In the case of Janus v. American Federation of State and County Municipal Employees, No. 16-1466 (6/27/2018), the court ruled that employees who are not members of a union cannot be compelled to pay reduced dues, even though they accept the benefits of the union bargaining. See the Janus decision here. It was a legal theory that had kicked around for decades. If a non-member is compelled to pay dues at a reduced rate, is the non-member being forced to support activity for which s/he does not believe? Over time, unions dealt with that concern by reducing the dues for non-members and by ensuring the money devoted to political advocacy came from a different pot of money. Even so, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Janus that compelling dues violated the First Amendment.

I say the decision was unwise, because that same reasoning has permeated groups and associations for decades. The U.S. Supreme Court did not just overturn decades of precedent, but it also unsettled accepted norms. Now, just a few weeks later, two members of the Oregon Bar Association have filed suit arguing that being forced to pay dues to a state bar association violates their First Amendment rights, as well. The bar association, the plaintiffs say, advocates for political and ideological speech with which they disagree. There is probably some truth to that argument. Every state bar association advocates for some political goals, even if the goals are generally accepted. They advocate for goals like maintaining a bar association, for preventing unlawful practice of law, and more. While most of us see the benefit of preventing non-licensed persons practicing law, some may not. Yet, every state requires bar membership. The plaintiffs point out in their lawsuit, however, that while state licensing is necessary, state bar membership need not be necessary. See ABA BarJournal report about the Oregon lawsuit here.

And, of course, a few months ago, the Oregon Bar Association published a statement accusing Pres. Trump of catering to white nationalists and a second statement which condemned white nationalism. The bar association refunded the dues for members who requested a refund. One of the plaintiffs in this lawsuit did receive a refund, while the other did not seek a refund. But, even apart from those political statements, every bar association engages in some small measure of political advocacy. What happens when some members disagree? When a boy joins the boy scouts, is he required to agree with every political view taken by the Boy Scouts of America?

The Supreme Court may have opened a Pandora’s box. We will see how this evolves.

An engineer worked for Texas Commission on Environmental Quality or 23 years. Shiyan Jiang was never in any trouble until in 2014, he was assigned a new boss, Kim Wilson. The new boss believed Mr. Jiang placed some papers in a permit folder that did not belong there. The plaintiff then filed a complaint alleging discrimination based on age and ethnic origin. The supervisor then found many more things wrong with the long-time engineer, including raising his voice and disputing settled policy matters. Ms. Wilson placed the engineer on probation. During the probation, he had two meetings with supervisors. No incident occurred after the second meeting, yet, the supervisor recommended termination.

Mr. Jiang filed suit as Jiang v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, No. 17-CV-00739 (W.D. Tex. 8/13/2018). The TCEQ moved for summary judgment. The Western District court noted that there was evidence that some other co-workers raised their voices on occasion. Other co-workers sometimes placed draft documents into a permit folder. And, others debated policy with their supervisors. Mr. Jiang submitted a statement on his behalf in responding to the motion for summary judgment. The employer tried to argue that Jiang’s Declaration was based on subjective belief. But, his testimony was corroborated by co-workers. The employer then argued that the co-worker affidavits were based on subjective belief. But, noted the court, the co-workers presented facts to support their beliefs.

The court also noted that two other senior employees were placed on probation or issued written warnings after they complained about age discrimination. And, the court noted  that Mr. Jiang complained about race discrimination at the second probation meeting. The very next day, the supervisor recommended he be terminated. That is a very close nexus indeed between opposing discrimination and then suffering an adverse personnel action. The court found that viewing all this evidence in totality, a jury could infer a pattern of behavior of retaliation against persons who complaint about discrimination. It found that there were issues of fact regarding the employer’s articulated reasons for the termination. So, the court denied the employer’s motion for summary judgment. See the decision here.

The judge ruled correctly. The affidavits of co-workers, if supported by factual observations, are much more than mere “subjective” belief.

Judge Fred Biery is a wonderful asset to the San Antonio legal community. Recently, he demonstrated again why he is the right judge at the right time. One of the costliest and most time-consuming lawsuits in recent memory is the House Canary v. Quicken Loans, Inc., No. SA-18-CV-0519 (W.D. Tex. 8/14/2018) lawsuit. A few months ago, a Bexar County jury awarded $700 million to the tech startup, House Canary. The lawsuit stems from a subsidiary of Quicken Loans which had asked House Canary to develop software. The subsidiary sued for fraud and breach of contract. Quicken Loans lost in one of the largest jury verdicts in Bexar County ever. See San Antonio Business Journal report here.

Quicken Loans then filed a related lawsuit in federal court. House Canary moved to dismiss or to transfer the suit to Michigan. At issue are jurisdiction, venue, and opposition to injunctive relief, all the normal requisites for time-consuming and expensive litigation. Judge Biery often speaks to the increased cost of lawsuits. His father and uncle were well known trial lawyers in San Antonio. Judge Biery is qualified to speak to the increased litigation costs in today’s society.

So, he called for a status conference, likely anticipating yet another drawn out legal battle. He wanted the parties to act in a civil manner. He expects zealous advocacy, he said, but no “elementary school behavior.” He expects the parties to produce all information requested in discovery. Lay the cards on the table, he ordered. The Court observed, and the respective lawyers surely know, that all would be revealed anyway if the case is appealed and then remanded. It would be more efficient to first produce what you have.

He asked the parties (i.e. the respective lawyers) to avoid “shrill” pleadings. He warned them that he has in past lawsuits ordered opposing lawyers who violated his rules to sit in timeout in the rotunda of the courthouse. He ordered another set of lawyers to kiss each other on the lips in front of the Alamo with cameras present. He discussed indirectly the change in litigation in San Antonio. Once the city was home to some 300 lawyers, all of whom, knew each other. They did not need court orders, because once they reached an agreement, they would abide by that agreement. He seemed then to point the finger at “Yankee” lawyers, that is lawyers moving into the state from the north and western regions of the country. He helped to make his point by including a map of Texas with arrows pointing at the state boundaries from Oklahoma and New Mexico, indicating migration from those states and beyond. He reminded us of a saying by Hobart Huson, a former San Antonio lawyer and historian, “Texans, you are guarding the wrong river.”

The Judge is certainly correct that us lawyers are more litigious than our predecessors. But, perhaps, if we start guarding the right river, we can find a balance. See Judge Biery’s order here.

Its a pretty clear First Amendment violation, firing Peter Strzok. The President and Rep. Meadows have made some hay about Agent Strzok supposedly using influence in regard to the Mueller investigation into Pres. Trump. But, there has been no evidence of Strzok allegedly using his influence to affect the investigation. Agent Strzok specifically said “we will stop” the election of Pres, Trump in 2016. He said he was talking about “we” the voters. That was protected speech by a federal employee. See CBS news report here.

In firing the FBI agent and linking the firing to his comments about the President, the employer has set up a lawsuit nicely for the agent, if he wishes to pursue it. It was very unwise of the FBI to fire him for unsupported reasons. If the President and others could show actual influence over the investigation, my opinion would change. But, for now, there is no evidence of him exerting any actual influence over the investigation. Too, as he pointed out when he testified to Congress, if he wanted to affect the outcome of the 2016 election, he could have leaked the fact that the Trump campaign was being investigated in 2016.

Firing the agent may have placated some folks in the Executive branch, but that short-term gain may result in long-term pain.

it happens more and more. A jilted lover posts pictures of his former girlfriend on the internet. Only this former lover kept doing it over and over. Mark J. Uhlenbrock was a pilot for United Airlines. He formed a relationship with a stewardess who uses the name Jane Doe. The relationship started in 2002 and lasted about four years. He took some pictures of her in the nude with her permission – and some pictures without permission. The stewardess obtained restraining orders against him here in Bexar County in 2009 and again in 2011. He just kept posting the pictures. The pilot settled her case against him for $110,000. But, the harassment did not stop.

In 2013, the stewardess went to their mutual employer, United Airlines. But, the employer failed to take appropriate action, says the EEOC. The EEOC filed suit recently against United Airlines for failing to do something about the pilot’s conduct. In 2015, Mr. Uhlenbrock was arrested by the FBI and his computers were seized. United granted him ing-term disability in January, 2016. He received the long-term disability payments until July, 2016. In June, 2016, he pleaded guilty in federal court to internet stalking. He was sentenced to 41 months in prison for the offense.

Mr. Uhlenbrock said he had an addiction to posting nude photos on the internet. See San Antonio Express News report here. The EEOC appears to be arguing that United kept the pilot on its payroll several months after he pleaded guilty to stalking and that the employer took no steps to stop him from posting the pictures. The challenge in these sorts of cases is showing the employer had a duty to address behavior which occurred off-premises. This may become the exemplar for such cases, since the relationship clearly started on company premises on company time. At least one of the pictures was of Ms. Doe in her flight attendant uniform.

Even worse, the federal violations continued long after the stewardess complained. Ms. Doe filed suit in state court in Bexar County, and complained to management long before the EEOC filed this new lawsuit. At one point, United said it could not take action because the harassment was not related to work. The captain never received any discipline for his conduct. See Texas Lawyer report. The lawsuit is filed as Suit No. 18-CV-817 in the Western District.

I wrote about a pushy judge in the Paul Manafort trial here. The judge was fussing at the prosecutor and the prosecutor fussed back a bit. Now, the judge has apologized and explained to the jury that he was “probably wrong” for criticizing the prosecutor regarding one of the witnesses. IRS agent Michael Welch had been allowed earlier to sit in the court room and observe testimony. Perhaps forgetting his previous order, Judge Ellis fussed at the prosecutors for allowing a witness to sit in the court room prior to his testimony. So, later the prosecutorial team asked the judge to explain his oversight to the jury. See The Hill news report here.

It is probably symptomatic of the poor working relationship between the judge and the prosecutors that this inadvertent mistake occurred. The judge had fussed at them so much that he assumed they had erred. He spoke too soon, apparently.

Trials are not what we see on television. The judges and juries are not always somber, listening closely and making no mistakes. This is real life. The prosecutors saw the error and asked the judge to fix it. The judge is acting strangely. When relating a ruling that the prosecutor, Greg Andres did not like. Judge Ellis said Mr. Andres should not cry. The prosecutor said he was not crying. Judge Ellis remarked that well, his eyes were watery. There was no need for that retort.

Many plaintiffs complain they are treated differently than other co-workers in some way. It might be about pay, promotion opportunities, etc. In one case, two plaintiffs said they were treated differently than other peers and that they were subjected to derogatory comments about Italians. In Cicalese v. University of Texas Medical Branch, No. 17-CV-0067, 2018 US Dist. LEXIS 46796 (S.D. Tex. 3/22/2018), the employer filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Rule 12(b)(6) addresses the failure to state a claim. Dr. Cicalese was born in Italy. He and his wife both worked for UTMB. His wife, Dr. Rastellini, was also born in Italy and was also a medical doctor. Things went well for the couple the first five years at UTMB. But, when a new dean started working there, things went downhill. The doctors say the new dean targeted them based on their heritage as Italians. The dean, said the plaintiffs, when he first met them, told them they should go back to Italy. He made additional negative comments about Italians.

The dean removed some positions from the two doctors. But, it appears the adverse personnel action which forms the basis of their suit is denial of tenure.

The Plaintiffs’ allegations were not specific. Dr. Rastellini alleged other, unnamed comparators were granted tenure with lesser credentials. But, she did not name them. She did not describe what those lesser credentials looked like. She did name others, but not in the context of comparative employees. The court resurrected the so-called four-part test found in Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1996), regarding so-called stray remarks. I previously discussed the stray remarks doctrine here regarding a 2015 Fifth Circuit decision. In that decision in Goudeau v. National Oilwell Varco, LP,793 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2-15), the court tried to clear up the confusion surrounding the stray remarks doctrine. The point of the 2015 decision was that a remark which shows discriminatory bias on its face has some value, even if they may be old. Even older remarks can serve as evidence of pretext, said the court in 2015.

But in Cicalese, the court relied on Brown to find the remarks too remote in time. But, as the Goudeau court explained, even remarks that might be old in time, provide some relevance to the circumstantial evidence case. They might well be relevant to help show pretext. “In a circumstantial case like this one, in which the discriminatory remarks are just one ingredient in the overall evidentiary mix, we consider the remarks under a “more flexible” standard.” Goodeau, at p. 475.

But, the Southern District (Hanks) made no reference to Goudeau. It did not discuss a more flexible standard. Instead, it relied on the old strict formula that makes little sense. The complaint apparently did not mention the time period in which the three purported remarks were made. But, if a decision-maker makes a remark which shows bias on its face, such a remark would hold some relevance for a very long time period. This decision does appear to be oriented toward reaching a particular result. See the Cicalese decision here.