Kate Rogers was hired as the Executive Director of the Alamo Trust in 2021. The Alamo Trust runs the Alamo on a day-to-day basis. While, the General Land Office actually owns the Alamo. The Alamo Trust is a private non-profit, and the GLO, of course, is an arm of the Texas state government. The two entities act in concert based on a contract between the two parties to operate the Alamo. When Ms. Rogers was first interviewed for the position, she was interviewed by members of the Alamo Trust and by a senior employee of the GLO.

In October, 2025, someone gave Lt-Gov. Dan Patrick a copy of Ms. Rogers’ dissertation from a California university. Her dissertation dated from 2023. The paper was “published” in 2023. But, publishing a dissertation simply means it would now become accessible on some dusty library shelf. No one but the librarian and random researchers would be aware of its existence.

In that paper, Ms. Rogers referred to some of the political challenges of operating a historical icon like the Alamo. The paper was never otherwise made public. Yet, Lt-Gov. Patrick called Rogers and told her he did not care for the comments in her dissertation. He told the Executive Director to resign. Patrick asked her to keep the phone call a secret. Rogers resisted both suggestions.

At first, the Alamo Trust Board supported Rogers. But, then Patrick called Hope Andrade, the Treasurer of the Alamo Board and told her he wanted Rogers forced out. Andrade then called Rogers and asked her to resign. She reportedly told Rogers that she needed to resign or be fired. About this time, Land Commissioner Dawn Buckingham tweeted that she supported Patrick’s decision to force out Ms. Rogers. This all occurred within about two weeks.

Ms. Rogers filed suit based in First Amendment grounds. That suit is known as Rogers v. Alamo Trust, Inc., Et Al, No. 25-CV-1500 (W.D. Tex.). The Alamo Trust, Commissioner Buckingham and Lt-Gov. Patrick have all moved to dismiss Rogers’ lawsuit. And, of course, from the time she was hired until her termination in 2025, Lt-Gov. Patrick, Land Commissioner Buckingham all played prominent roles in the daily operations of the Alamo. They argue now in their motions to dismiss that they had nothing to with the actions of Alamo Trust, a private non-profit entity. But, their prior actions suggest otherwise.

Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.Pro. Rule 12(b)(6) asks whether the allegations are plausible, not whether they are likely to succeed. Yet, the motions of all three defendants emphasize that Roger’s allegations are unlikely to succeed. They argue that the Alamo Trust is a private entity and cannot be subject to 42 U.S.C. §1983. But, as Plaintiff Rogers points out, when private entities act in coordination with a state entity, then their actions do indeed fall within the purview of Sec. 1983.

Free Speech

The three parties make the almost frivolous argument that Roger’s comments in her dissertation were “highly critical” of the Texas legislature. But, in reality, her comments are rather sterile, much like typical academic observations:

“Philosophically, I do not believe it is the role of politicians to determine what professional educators can or should teach in the classroom. Instead, teachers should be afforded the autonomy to make those decisions based on their own expertise as well as the needs of their students.” 

The three parties strain mightily in their briefs to turn comments like this into supposed “highly critical” comments of the Texas legislature. But, even if they succeed, that argument goes to the weight of the evidence, not to its plausibility. Plaintiff Rogers has clearly made out a plausible case. That does not mean she wins her case. It simply means the motions to dismiss should be denied.

The three defendants also make the remarkable claim that Ms. Rogers was not fired. Alamo Trust argues that Rogers actually resigned. Director Rogers did in fact submit a letter of resignation. But, that silly argument will fade quickly. It does not take a rocket scientist to appreciate that persons often resign under threat of termination. This argument does not go to plausibility. It goes to the weight of the evidence.

Lt-Gov. Patrick denies any role in Rogers’ forced resignation and simply argues that she resigned of her own free will. But, again, that argument applies to the weight of the evidence, not to whether Roger’s allegations are plausible. Even in the best of times, it will take the court months to resolve these three motions to dismiss. But, now all Federal courts and especially the Western District of Texas is inundated with writs of habeas corpus.

The Trump administration has enjoyed itself firing boatloads of Federal employees. The most common recourse for civil service employees who were fired for no just reason is the Merit Systems Protection Board. The MSPB essentially enforces the Civil Service Reform Act. A civil servant can only be fired for a just reason. But, since so many civil servants were fired, the MSPB is inundated with appeals.

Maureen Comey, daughter of James Comey, and her lawyers came up with a novel if risky alternative. I talked about her lawsuit previously here. They filed suit in Federal court, bypassing the swamped MSPB. A Federal court in New York agreed with Comey’s position,. The court found that since Pres. Trump cited his Article II (of the U.S. Constitution) powers, then the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 does not apply. Ms. Comey can indeed proceed straight to U.S. district court. The CSR Act created the MSPB. If Ms. Comey was not fired under the terms of the CSR Act, then the MSPB is not her mandated avenue for redress.

This decision is similar to one reached by another Federal court in Virginia regarding another fired civil servant. See NOTUS report here.

Be Careful What You Ask For

Remarkably, in the other case, Comans v. Executive Office of the President, 25-CV-1237, 2026 WL 1132803 (E.D. Vir. April 15, 2026), Mary Comans first filed her appeal with the MSPB. As part of that action, DOJ said since she was fired by the President in reliance on his “Article II” power, then her cases did not belong with the MSPB. Later, she filed a new lawsuit in U.S. District Court. In that second action, Department of Justice then said her claim belonged with the MSPB. Yes, that is how lawsuits are lost: when the lawyers cannot keep track of their inconsistent arguments to the court. The Department of Justice is paying a price for having fired or asked to resign so many career prosecutors.

See the decision in Comey v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, No. 25-CV-7625 (S.D. N.Y. April 28, 2026) here. This is new territory for most of us. It has been decades, if not a century or two since Federal employees had the right to file suit in Federal court for a termination. This result calls to mind an old saying, “be careful what you ask for; you might just get it.”

Everyone likes Artificial Intelligence. A person can access deep information within just a couple minutes. But, in doing so, the person may sacrifice certain rights. In U.S. v. Heppner, 2026 WL 436479 (S.D. N.Y. Feb.17, 2026), Bradley Heppner was charged with securities fraud in Dallas. Like many persons, he then consulted with a lawyer and with Claude, an AI platform. Heppner did this on his own. His lawyer had no involvement in researching issues via Claude. In response to discovery, Heppner and his lawyer asserted the attorney-client privilege and the work product privilege regarding that research. The prosecutor moved to compel and the court sided with the government. It is safe to assume that if the defendant tried to avoid providing the material, then it would have caused him some harm. So, we assume something in Heppner’s research would harm his case.

Mr. Heppner had inputted information to Claude that he gained from his lawyer. He then created AI documents which he planned to share with his lawyer. And, he did then share those AI documents with his lawyer.

Attorney-Client Privilege

Regarding the attorney-client privilege, the court dispensed with that argument quickly. Heppner was acting on his own volition, not at the direction of his lawyer. While Mr. Heppner might have inputted legal advice from his lawyer, that alone did not make his research via Claude privileged. The court noted that it was comparable to Heppner telling a friend or co-worker what his lawyer had told him. Such a communication is not protected by the attorney-client privilege.

Too, providing information to a third party, even if just an internet website, generally waives the attorney-client privilege. A person cannot seriously claim that by providing information to the internet that they wanted that information kept private.

Work-Product Privilege

The court was more troubled by the argument that happier communicated with Claude, so as to better prepare to consult with his attorney. But, Heppner did this on his own. He was not directed by his attorney to consult with Claude. He was not conducting legal research for his lawyer. So, the question is whether Heppner sought legal advice from Claude, not whether he shared outputs from Claude with his lawyer.

The work-product privilege was more complicated. Some courts recognize that a layperson can prepare for possible litigation. Therefore, materials used during that process might be included within the work product privilege. But, again here, happier acted on his own volition, not at the request of his lawyer. The Judge recognized that non-lawyers can indeed anticipate litigation. But, the materials they use in that process will not “protect a lawyer’s mental processes.

Heppner involved a criminal case. A civil lawsuit might produce a different result. One court has recognized that Fed.R.Civ.Pro. Rule 26(b)(3) protects the work product of a party, not just counsel. Morgan v. V2X, No. 25-CV-01991 (D.C. Solo. March 30, 2026). For my part, I still counsel clients to avid AI. Inputs to AI might be harmless, but they could also reveal information best left safeguarded.

See the decision in U.S. v. Heppner here.

I previously wrote about Judge Rosie Speedily Gonzalez here. She was indicted for Unlawful Restraint by a Peace Officer. It is extremely rare for a judge to be indicted. Judge Gonzalez has now decided to resign her position and to agree to a lifetime ban from ever becoming a judge again. The District Attorney also asked the presiding judge to dismiss the indictment against Judge Gonzalez. That suggests Judge Gonzalez agreed to a plea bargain with the D.A.’s office.

Judge Gonzalez’ action in handcuffing a defense attorney was completely extraordinary. Apparently simply because the lawyer was representing her client zealously, as she was required to do.

See San Antonio Express -News report here.

A jury in Federal court has found the Texas Department of Public Safety guilty of discrimination against two black DPS troopers. In what sounds like a wide ranging lawsuit, the two officers alleged years of discrimination and being passed over for promotion. The jury awarded the two troopers $1.7 million in damages.

Like most discrimination lawsuits, the employer apparently tried to point to performance problems. The Assistant Attorney General who defended the case argued that Special Agent Jari McPherson had lied to supervisors and former Cpl. Jerold Sams had “leadership and communication” problems. But, as with all such cases, the issue is whether other troopers had similar problems and were promoted.

Internal Complaint

McPherson filed his first internal complaint in 2019 at the Temple location where he worked. He requested a transfer to Austin for a new start. But, his supervisor in Austin spoke badly about him before he even arrived at the new Austin location. The new supervisor specifically mentioned the 2019 complaint. Mr. McPherson was then passed over for promotion in favor of a white officer with less experience. He was then placed in a “minority only” unit where they were given poor assignments.

Special Agent McPherson is still employed with DPS. That must have made this lawsuit exceedingly difficult. Aware of the suit, most co-workers will avoid and decline to talk to the plaintiff. Mr. McPherson shed a few tears when the jury verdict came back with its verdict.

Cpl. Sams served in the horse unit. Sams had grown up with horses. A white lieutenant accused him of trying to turn the DPS horse unit into a “Buffalo Soldiers Unit.” A commander urged him to consider how it looked with “all these African Americans on the mounted unit.”

One former captain testified that DPS was like a large dysfunctional family, apparently in support of the two officers.

Jury Verdict

The jury awarded Cpl. Sams $875,000 for emotional suffering type damages and Agent McPherson $800,000 for economic and emotional damages. See San Antonio Express News report here. Cpl. Sams retired after 26 years as a Trooper. It’s safe to conclude that if he was there 26 years, he was doing something right. Federal juries are challenging, so this is a significant verdict.

Arbitration agreements appear in several industries, automobile dealerships, online subscriptions and, of course, in many jobs. The employer will often ask a new employee to sign an arbitration agreement in their first few days of a new job. But, are all those arbitration agreements binding? In Mertens v. Benelux, the Fifth Circuit applied Texas law to find that the failure of the employer to sign one such arbitration agreement rendered the agreement invalid.

The arbitration agreement used by Benelux contained this language:

“By signing this arbitration agreement, Employer . . . represents that they each agree to be bound by the agreement”

That language, said the court meant both parties must sign the agreement. If one party does not sign, then the agreement is not binding on both parties. The General Manager of the club did not sign it through oversight. He admitted that he assumed some other representative of the club had signed it.

But, Benelux argued that a party must “clearly and explicitly” express an intent to make signatures a condition precedent to forming a contract. The employer argued that the agreement lacked language stating that a signature “shall” or “must” occur before the agreement becomes a binding contract. The court did not agree. The court noted that Texas caselaw did not require only certain words to make signatures a condition precedent. Words such as “shall” or “must” were not always required to create a condition precedent. Other types of wording had the same effect, said the Fifth Circuit.

See the decision in Mertens v. Benelux Corp., 162 F.4th 492 (5th Cir. Dec. 17, 2025) here.

I previously wrote about the tech company known as Anthropic here. This case concerns Department of Defense slapping a label on the company that it was a supply chain risk. Historically, that label has only been applied to companies in adversarial foreign countries.

The Federal Judge in San Fransisco agreed with the company and issued a preliminary injunction against the Department of Defense. After a hearing and, I expect, very lengthy briefing by both sides, the Judge wrote:

“Nothing in the governing statute supports the Orwellian notion that an American company may be branded a potential adversary and saboteur of the U.S. for expressing disagreement with the government,”

That is stark language for a U.S. District Judge. It is fair to conclude that the evidence of DOD’s retaliatory intent was strong. Of course, as always with this administration, it did not help DOD’s case that Pres. Trump said some very critical things just before DOD applied this label to Anthropic. Just based on public comments, it did indeed look like the administration was engaging in reprisal against the company.

See CNBC report here.

Discovery is a central step in all lawsuits. Perhaps even more so in employment cases. Since, in almost every employment suit, the employer has 90% of the pertinent documents. But, the discovery obligations apply to both sides. In one recent case, Hernandez v. Results Staffing, Inc., No. 4:14-CV-182 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2017), the plaintiff, Jose Hernandez called in sick the day after his Reserve drill weekend. On Monday, Mr. Hernandez told his boss that he had to go to the Emergency Room, because he aggravated a bad back while at drill the prior weekend.

RSI then fired Hernandez, because he did not call in four hours prior to his sick day. Hernandez filed suit under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Act (USERRA). Under USERRA, a Reservist is entitled to time off as necessary to treat an injury sustained while on military duty. As is normal in such suits, the employer asked for his medical records related to the ER visit. The plaintiff produced a return-to-work medical note and that was all. The Plaintiff also signed a medical release, which would allow the employer to obtain Hernandez’ medical records on their own.

The Fax Machine

Just a few days before trial, the Plaintiff’s attorney, Ryan Ray, came into possession of the medical records related to Hernandez’ ER visit. He faxed them to the Defendant. But, unknown to Mr. Ray, the fax did not go through. Among those records was a document stating that Hernandez came in mainly due to a headache, but also due to lower back pain.

The suit was before the infamous Judge McBryde in Ft. Worth, Texas. In a bench trial, Judge McBryde found in favor of the employer. Hernandez appealed and the Fifth Circuit reversed the finding and found in favor of the plaintiff. A key issue was the reason for Hernandez’ ER visit. At the oral hearing before the Fifth Circuit, the court asked the defense lawyer if there was any rebuttal evidence to Hernandez’ claim that he went to ER due to back problems incurred at his drill weekend. The defense lawyer told the court no.

All this time, the Defendant never requested Mr. Hernandez’ medical records themselves. They had his signed release and could have done so. But, they did not.

Additional Discovery

Over a year later, the Defendant did come into possession of the ER records – apparently as part of litigation over Mr. Hernandez’ damages. The employer then submitted a rare Fed. R.Civ.Pro. Rule 60(b) for relief from judgment and and Rule 37 motion for sanctions. The Plaintiff defended himself on three grounds:

  • the Fifth Circuit rendered the judgment. Therefore, the district court (Judge McBryde) lacked jurisdiction,
  • the employer had an opportunity to obtain the records, but did not do so, and
  • the plaintiff complied with his discovery obligations by providing the employer a signed release.

It probably does not need to be said that the plaintiff lost before Judge McBryde. So, the real appeal was at the Fifth Circuit. But, the higher court was at least as dismissive of the plaintiff’s arguments.

The appellate court noted rightly that the obligation to produce medical records in your possession is not satisfied by providing a signed release. If the party has records that have been requested, he must provide them. Period. But, with all the fuss over this breach of discovery obligations, both Judge McBride and the Fifth Circuit were laser focused on the ER medical record. The medical document said the chief complaint was headaches. The two court opinions mention only in passing the concomitant lower back pain. The district court flat accused the Plaintiff and his wife of lying at trial – apparently because neither one mentioned the headaches. They both only discussed the terrible back pain.

The Fifth Circuit was equally accusatory, finding support in the record for the finding that Mr. Hernandez and his wife had lied. It appears none of the judges considered that Hernandez likely went to ER with both headaches and lower back pain. But, the testimony at trial would have been different if the defense attorney knew that Hernandez also complained about headaches.

Release of Medical Records

Regarding Plaintiff’s argument that he did provide a signed release, the Fifth Circuit noted correctly that the Federal rules do not allow gamesmanship and deception. In the Fifth Circuit’s view, providing a signed release simply meant the plaintiff knew there were risky medical records out there, but was hoping the employer would not find them. My opinion, that assumption is not based on the record. If the plaintiff really wanted to hide medical records, he would not have signed a medical release.

The Fifth Circuit then found that the plaintiff had prevailed due to misconduct. That misconduct included the failure to disclose Mr. Hernandez’ medical records those few days before the trial. The higher court found that Mr. Ray had deliberately suppressed the discovery material. He certainly must have been aware of the records when he appeared before the Fifth Circuit the first time. At that oral hearing, he would have heard the defense attorney tell the court that there was no counter-vailing evidence to the claim that Hernandez went to ER due to a military related injury. So, on their second appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s relief from judgment – meaning it allowed the district court to remove the judgment in favor of the plaintiff. See Hernandez v. Results Staffing, Inc. 907 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 2018).

The Plaintiff then filed a motion to reconsider at the district court level and lost. The parties then reached a settlement.

Sanctions

At that point, the district court severed attorney Ray from the original lawsuit and started an action addressing Mr. Ray’s alleged suppression of evidence. The judge initiated an action to disbar Mr. Ray from the Northern District of Texas. The Judge eventually did so. Mr. Ray then appealed.

But, the decision was largely foregone at this point. One district judge and one court of appeals panel had already found that Mr. Ray deliberately suppressed discovery material. On appeal a new panel of appellate judges found that Mr. Ray failed to comply with his discovery obligations. The court agreed that disbarment from the Northern District of Texas was appropriate. See In Re Ray, 951 F.3d 650 (5th Cir. 2020).

Reality

In reality, what likely happened was that Mr. Ray thought he had faxed the material. But, he should have known the fax did not go through. Fax machines and fax services always notify the sender if a fax was successful or not. Mr. Ray should have retained such a confirmation as proof. Either he did not save the confirmation or he did not look for it. Too, it was unwise to argue a technical issue regarding jurisdiction. If Mr. Ray simply admitted to a foul-up in his office, things might have turned out differently. He might have done better if he had simply accepted some responsibility for not providing the medical records.

Too, the problem for the plaintiff is that he likely suffered both headaches and back pain on that fateful Monday. His back pain stemmed from his service in the Iraq war. But, with all the fuss over what his lawyer did or did not do, it was easy for the district court – the infamous Judge McBryde – to lose focus on the full range of complaints Mr. Hernandez presented to ER. Judge McBryde was sanctioned by the Fifth Circuit in 1997. It is rare as snow in July for a Federal judge to be sanctioned. He was known to abuse lawyers. But, he particularly abused plaintiff lawyers.

The act known as “bills of attainder” is old. It goes back to pre-1776 England. A bill of attainder occurred when Parliament would pass a bill that settled a legal dispute. A bill of attainder could find that certain creditors were not in fact owed money, or that certain heirs cannot in fact inherit. It was a way around the judicial process, a path available only to the well-connected. So, in the days after 1776, many state legislatures prohibited bills of attainder. The U.S. Constitution adopted in 1787 specifically prohibited bills of attainder and its evil twin, ex post facto laws. U.S. Const., Art. Sec. 9.

The Trump administration right at the start of its current term issued several Executive Orders targeting certain big law firms. Four courts blocked those EOs, in part because they acted like bills of attainder. Those EOs specifically found those big law firms guilty of perceived offenses with no process. Yet, despite losing all the four challenges to those Executive Orders, the Trump administration has essentially issued another bill of attainder like decision. It decided that Anthropic, the AI company, was a threat to the U.S. supply chain. That designation has in the past only been applied to companies selling goods to China.

I previously talked about bills of attainder here.

Anthropic has filed suit against the U.S. government regarding this designation. It hired one of the four big law firms who won their suits regarding the Executive Orders, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr. Just based on the timing of the government’s designation, it is clear the U.S. government is retaliating against Anthropic over its refusal to allow its AI engine to be used for domestic surveillance and fully autonomous weapons. It is a suit that Anthropic is very likely to win. But, for today’s U.S. government, it is never about winning. See ABA Bar Journal report here for more information.

I previously wrote about Pres. Trump’s clearly unlawful attacks on big law firms here and here. Since then, all four big law firms which challenged that very strange Executive Order won motions to dismiss at the district court level. That means even without a formal hearing, the judges agreed that Pres. Trump’s silly EO held no water. Those four different cases were then consolidated on appeal. The appeal was lodged with the D.C. Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C.

Wisely it seemed at the time, Dept. of Justice on Monday, March 2, filed a motion seeking to withdraw its appeals against the four big firms. For about 24 hours, it appeared the firms had won. It appeared DOJ decided against pursuing a futile appeal. But, no, the next day, Tuesday, DOJ filed a new motion asking to withdraw its Monday motion. DOJ said it now wished to pursue these appeals, after all. “Oops,” they said, sort of. The Department pointed out that the Court had not yet ruled on its Monday motion asking to drop the appeals.

In the legal business, like most businesses, its is rather embarrassing to change your mind within 24 hours. I am sure some higher level person, seeing the publicity about the four big firms claiming victory, prompted a change. But, now, how must it look to three busy, over-worked appellate judges at having to work on an appeal that was withdrawn for 24 hours? This inability to make up its mind is the opposite of effective advocacy. Effective advocacy involves reminding the court at every step that you believe in your case. Changing your mind twice in two days is the oppostivce of effective advocacy. See ABA BA Journal here for more information.