A frequent question in disability cases concerns how long can an employer take when considering a request for accommodation. Some requests are so urgent that any delay will cause irreparable injury. In Strife v. Aldine Independent School District, No. 24-20269 (5th Cir. May 16, 2025), we get some answers. In Strife, a teacher, Alisha Strife, was a combat veteran of the Iraq war. She had been diagnosed with PTSD. She asked to bring a service animal to work with her. She provided two notes from two different VA doctors. But, Aldine ISD objected to the first letter, because the doctor was a Pharmacist, who practiced psychiatry with a VA protocol to treat veterans. Ms. Strife then provided the second letter from another VA psychiatrist.

Delay

Then Aldine ISD asked the doctor to complete a lengthy questionnaire in August. Then the employer asked Strife to sit for a medical exam. At that point, Ms. Strife rightfully felt the district was dragging out the process. In November, the entity that certified the service animal notified Aldine that its actions amounted to discrimination. A week later, the district asked Ms. Strife if she was refusing to continue with the interactive process. A couple days later, Strife’s attorney wrote a letter to the school district explaining the law of accommodations. Aldine’s lawyer then responded that the district had a right to consider other accommodations in addition to a service animal.

(Of course, that is a strange response. It is hard to imagine an accommodation that would meet the patient’s needs for 24/7 support that do not include a service animal).

Strife’s lawyer then replied asking what other “additional” accommodations Aldine was considering. Aldine then responded that the two letters from the doctors were not reliable, because they lacked letterhead and had conflicting doctor titles. (At this point, it had to occur to Strife’s lawyer that Aldine was deliberately stringing her along).

Two More Letters

In December, 2023, Aldine scheduled Ms. Strife for a medical exam. The following January, Strife’s lawyer provided two more letters from doctors indicating that Strife needed the use of a service animal at work. Ms. Strife also filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. That same month. Aldine ISD rejected the two new letters, because they did not discuss other possible accommodations.

Dismissal

Eventually, Ms. Strife filed suit. The district court granted Aldine’s motion to dismiss regarding Strife’s failure to accommodate allegation. On appeal, however, the Fifth Circuit disagreed. The court fist noted that the issue of delay had not yet been addressed in the Fifth Circuit – except in non-binding dicta.

The Fifth Circuit noted that Aldine eventually granted Ms. Strife’s request for a service animal – after six months. The court noted that delay was not just potentially harmful to the employee. It also suggested a lack of good faith on the part of the employer in evaluating her request. The employee argued that she provided sufficient information such that school district should have been aware of her impairment. The Court agreed. When considering a motion to dismiss, a court should draw all inferences in favor of the non-movant. Ms. Strife met her burden to show adequate evidence such that the employer should have acknowledged her disability much sooner than it did.

Indeed, noted the court, the district did not grant her request for accommodation until after the employee filed suit. Aldine defended itself saying the delay caused no harm to Ms. Strife. But, the Fifth Circuit rejected that argument. It noted that the ADA does not require actual harm when denying or delaying a request for accommodation. The only question is whether Aldine “failed to make reasonable accommodations” after being informed of Strife’s limitations. The Court then reversed the lower court’s dismissal. See the Fifth Circuit opinion here.

The American Bar Association has filed suit against the Federal government over Pres. Trump’s Executive Orders targeting big law firms. The suit accuses Pres.Ttrump of coercing law firms into forgoing certain types of legal work, and to abandon some clients, causes and policy positions. The suit was filed against the President and over two dozen Federal agencies.

The suit notes that Pres. Trump targeted the firm Paul Wise, because it filed a pro bono lawsuit against certain particpants in the events of Jan. 6, 2021. The Executive Order also faulted the law firm Paul Weiss., because it hired Mark Pomerantz. Mr. Pomerantz was the former Assistant District Attorney in New York who tried to build a criminal case against Mr. Trump. Soon after the EOs, Trump announced a settlement with Paul Wise, in which the firm agreed to provide legal work for the President. Thus, the President “dragooned” the law firm into performing free legal work for him. Those actions amounted to a message to law firms as a whole.

Administration Disfavor

The ABA explains that it sought to sue the government over other actions that harmed the ABA. But, it could find no firms willing to do the work pro bono. Since, the law firms knew the administration disfavored such suits. An equity partner in a major law firm was prevented from performing certain legal work, because such work was disfavored by the White House. Yet, that same lawyer had performed similar work in the past – with no objection from his firm. The suit argues that Mr. Trump’s actions are already limiting persons’ access to legal counsel and constraining free speech.

These actions amount to violations of free expression under the First Amendment. They also constitute violation of separation of powers. The Executive Branch does not have the authority to convey to certain lawyers or law firms and dictate what work they may do by fiat. There should be some sort of due process involved. See the ABA Bar Journal report here for more information on this lawsuit.

It is rare when a court overturns a motion to compel arbitration. In Brown v. Child Advocates, Inc., No. 14-24-00012-CV (Tex.App. Hou. April 15, 2025), the court did just that. Ms. Chiffon Brown filed suit claiming CAI fired her when she refused to perform illegal acts. The employer produced an arbitration agreement. But, Ms. Brown said she had no recollection of signing the arbitration agreement. It was signed via electronic signature. The agreement had a unique provision, that the parties would attempt mediation before seeking arbitration.

Brown’s attorney suggested to CAI that they attempt mediation, before invoking arbitration. But, CAI proceeded to file a motion to compel arbitration. Without a hearing, the court granted CAI’s motion to compel arbitration. Once the parties were in arbitration, Brown pointed out that they still had not done any mediation. The Arbitrator replied that they are now in arbitration and they could now do mediation. But, Ms. Brown insisted under the terms of the arbitration agreement, they must do mediation before starting arbitration. The parties did mediate. No settlement occurred. Then Brown lost in front of the arbitrator. The employer filed a motion seeking to conform the arbitration award. At that point, the claimant objected that the pre-condition of mediation did not occur as required by the arbitration agreement. The trial court sided with the employer.

Security Procedures

On appeal the Fourteenth Court of Appeals agreed with the plaintiff. The court pointed to the requirements of Texas’ Uniform Electronic Transactions Act. Under that statute, to show a valid electronic signature, the employer must show various security procedures were in place when the employee signed the arbitration agreement. The burden is on the employer to show the electronic signature procedures were secure enough that only the employee in question could have signed the agreement.

The court of appeals reviewed an affidavit signed by CAI’s CEO and found it wanting. The affidavit did not show: 1) that creating the online account required personal information unique to Ms. Brown, 2) that security procedures are in place which would have prevented any unauthorized person from accessing the web page in place of Brown, 3) the affidavit did not present evidence corroborating Brown’s unique password and login, and 4) no evidence was shown that users must complete all steps before moving forward in the online process.

But, noted the court of appeals, CAI did present a copy of the arbitration agreement with Brown’s signature and a date and time stamp. That was sufficient evidence to put the burden back on Brown to show she did not sign the agreement.

Brown then testified via declaration that :

  • She never intended to enter a binding arbitration agreement.
  • She could not confirm that the electronic signature was hers.
  • She had no recollection of signing an arbitration agreement.
  • She never received a copy of the arbitration agreement while she was employed, and does not remember accessing an electronic version of the agreement.
  • If she had known about the possibility of opting-out of the agreement at the time that she allegedly signed the document, she would have “certainly” completed the proper form in order not to be bound by arbitration.

The court found Brown’s testimony sufficient to show she did not sign the agreement. It is not stated, but the court also seemed concerned by the lack of security procedures. The employer did present a “scintilla” of evidence that Brown likely signed the agreement. But, the court seemed less than impressed.

The court appeared to be impressed by Brown’s declaration that she would have opted out of arbitration if she had been aware of it. Having reviewed many of these appeals, I think it was the weakness of the employer’s evidence more than the strength of the employee’s evidence. In many cases concerning electronic signatures, the employee claims to have no recollection of having signed the arbitration agreement. Indeed, that is really the norm in electronic signature cases. The employees always claim to have no memory of the signing or of the agreement. The Fourteenth Court seemed impressed by Brown’s assertion that she would have opted out of any arbitration and by CAI’s lack of security procedures.

In Any Manner

The dissent was troubled by the decision. The dissent pointed to the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act’s catch-all phrase that an electronic signature can always be proven “in any manner.” The dissent believes the emphasis on security procedures was over-blown. The dissent believed presenting the arbitration agreement with a date and time stamp and Brown’s user name should suffice. But, if we were to accept the dissent’s view, then the requirement for security procedures would effectively be written out of the statute. See the opinion here.

Judge Richard J. Leon, of the D.C. District Court granted a permanent injunction agsinst Pres. Trump’s Executive Order which targeted the big law firm, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr. I previously wrote about that Executive Order here. Judge Leon used twenty-six exclamation points in his order. The EO, said the Judge, had a “kitchen sink of severe sanctions.” The judge found it violated the First Amendment protection against free speech, the Fifth Amendment regarding Wilmer Hale’s right to due process, and the Sixth Amendment regarding its clients’ right to counsel. It is an overwhelming win for the law firm against an exceedingly weak EO.

In its first sentence, the EO specifically mentioned the law firm hiring Robert Mueller. Mr. Mueller conducted the investigation into Pres. Trump in 2016. The EO pointed to Wilmer’ Hale’s participation in election and immigration litigation and said it participated in “partisan representations.” (As if in our adversarial process, there might be non-partisan representations). The EO clearly took aim at Wilmer Hale’s free speech rights.

By the time of Judge Leon’s decision, the EO had already resulted in two lawyers seeing their security clearances suspended. The Court’s order added that existing clients have already started to curtail their business with the firm and new clients are taking their business elsewhere. Provisions in the executive order “constitute a staggering punishment for the firm’s protected speech!” The Judge was clearly annoyed with the EO. He was right to be upset. EOs targeting law firms for protected speech does not even come close to lawful. See ABA Bar Journal report here for more information.

See Judge Leon’s order here.

Memorial Day is a time to remember those veterans who gave all they had to give for us. I always think of  1SGT Saenz at times like this. Some 100 of us IRR members met at Ft. Jackson on March 13, 2005. We reported to Ft. Jackson, South Carolina for in-processing and reintroduction to the US Army.  We knew we would be deploying to Iraq.  Then MSGT Carlos Saenz had a huge laugh and a booming voice. He laughed a lot.  

Those first few days, some Reservists were angry about being called up. Some were happy to be there. MSGT Saenz was reasonably happy to be where he was, preparing for duty in a war zone. Later, as I learned, he performed very well. He inspired his soldiers. He did everything a competent, dedicated leader would be expected to do.

He died in the dusty streets of Baghdad near the end of our tour. We were leaving Iraq in just a couple of weeks when his HMMWV was struck by an IED. He was out on a convoy training members of the incoming unit. Some of his regular team members were not with him on that run. He died doing what he did best, serving others.

We should all serve our country half as well as 1SGT Saenz. See a tribute to 1SGT Saenz at the Arlington cemetery website here.

After Ft. Jackson, we, the IRR folks, were assigned to various Civil Affairs units. I was assigned to the 445 CA Battalion. We called ourselves the Pirates. Whenever we snapped to attention, we would all let out a gutteral “arrgh” in true Pirate fashion. Paul A. Clevenger was a Pirate. He was one of the younger soldiers. SGT Clevenger was promoted from SPC4 during our time In Iraq. He did well, from what I heard.  I just remember that he smiled, often. His obituary is here.

Like many of us, PVT Clevenger returned to the States with some demons deep inside. He took his life some two years after we returned. SGT Clevenger is another casualty of the war  – he too gave his country all he had to give.

On this Memorial Day, let us recall the fallen – including the Confederate fallen.

I wrote about the hearing regarding the lawsuit filed by the law firm, Perkins Coie here. The Judge was clearly flabbergasted by the Executive Order targeting two big law firms. She asked at that hearing if this EO was not like something from the Joe McCarthy era? Well, Judge Howell has now issued her decision in the matter of Perkins Coie v. Dept. of Justice, No. 25-716-BAH (D.C. D.C. May 2, 2025). She has granted the two law firms’ motion for summary judgment. See her decision here.

Its is very rare for a U.S. District Judge to grant a motion for summary judgment this early in the life of a lawsuit. Summary judgment, as the name suggests, is a quick decision – one reached without benefit of a trial. In this instance, the judge issued her decision even before the discovery process has started. That is rare enough to compare to snow in July.

Kill All The Lawyers

But, it was an easy decision for the Judge. The President’s EO has so many holes in its premise and legal reasoning. It seems likely that it was not drafted by lawyers. In the very first paragraph of a 100 page opinion, the judge refers to the well-known phrase in Shakespeare’s play, Henry VI. “The first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers.” The speaker of that phrase is a rebel leader who wants to make himself king. As the rebel leader – and Shakespeare – knew, the first step in any rebellion is to remove those who implement the rule of law.

The judge finds that the plaintiffs, the two law firms, Perkins Coie and Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, are entitled to summary judgment on all their claims: 1) First Amendment free speech protection, 2) compelled disclosure in violation of the First Amendment, 3) denial of equal protection in violation of the Fifth Amendment, 4) denial of the clients of the two firms to pick their lawyers in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, 5) denial of due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment, 6) that the EO is unconstitutionally vague.

It should be obvious that a law firm may express its political views as it wishes. Yet, the EO and Pres. Trump’s public statements made it clear that the two firms were targeted largely because they supported politicians, such as Hillary Clinton, and views, such as opposing many of the electoral lawsuits filed in 2020 regarding Trump’s failed candidacy. The court noted that all but one of those election lawsuits lost.

The EO was drafted so poorly as to approach farce. It claimed in Sec. 1 that the law firms engaged in discrimination. Yet, no hearing, no finding on that issue was ever held. The EO pointed, instead, to the support of the two firms for various EEO type initiatives. Those initiatives verbally advocated greater diversity in law firm hiring. As the court noted, even if the court could find that such actions amounted to discrimination, the EO specifically targets not implementation of diversity hiring, but public support of such hiring. That is, on its face, the EO targets public speech. The DOJ compounded this error by claiming in its pleading that these accusations were not “seriously contested.”

One frequent hallmark of the current DOJ is it’s simple poor advocacy skills. Of course, these accusations were contested. It is disingenuous to claim otherwise. The law firm surely admitted to the statements. But, it also surely disputed that such statements rendered them guilty of discrimination.

All Employees

The court noted that Pres. Trump frequently expressed in public his ire at the firm and at Marc Elias in particular. But, Elias left the firm in 2021. Yet, the EO would cause harm to all the employees of Perkins Coie, which would include some 2500 employees, of whom about 1200 were lawyers. This number included about 24 persons with security clearances. About 12 of those held their clearances from prior military or government service.

One section specifically forbade any government agency from hiring any former Perkins Coie employee from without authorization. This provision does not explain the duration of such a prohibition. Does it apply to persons going directly from Perkins Coie to the government, or some time later? This provision, said the Judge amounts to a ban on any current or former employee from the two law firms – with no hearing or process to arrive at such a draconian step.

Compelled Disclosure

The EO requires government contractors to disclose any business they do with Perkins Coie. The law firm engages in much litigation. That means its business contacts cast a wide net. Compelled disclosure on association with groups engaged in advocacy acts as a restraint on freedom of association and free speech. The government may prevail on such compelled disclosure, but only if they satisfy a high standard for that restriction. DOJ acknowledged that high bar for such restrictions. But, in its pleading, it completely disregarded that the burden to meet that high bar falls on the government, not on the law firm. It made no showing of how the perceived offenses of the two law firms required compelled disclosures.

The court noted the obvious: that other law firms engaged in election lawsuits, but have not been targeted,. The EO amounts to a “class of one.” It targets one law firm by name, not a class of law firms or persons who engaged in given conduct. This violates the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. DOJ mentioned the Mansfield Rule, which seeks to diversify law firms. Perkins Coie and Wilmer Cutler issued public statements supporting the Mansfield goal. But, so did 358 other law firms. The government offered no explanation for targeting the two firms, but not the other 358 law firms. As the court noted, “Judges are not required to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free.” United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1300 (2d Cir. 1977) (Friendly, J.). Whenever a Judge points out they are not required to ignore the obvious, a litigant has truly lost.

Bills of Attainder

The court mentioned bills of attainder in a lengthy footnote. Bills of attainder were used in colonial America to target colonists who had incurred the ire of the British government. Bills of attainder are essentially an act of government finding persons guilty of some offense with no process. Bills of attainder are prohibited twice in the U.S. Constitution. Those two sections address Congressional powers. There is no similar provision regarding Presidential powers.

The court notes that this EO is similar to a bill of attainder. It finds the two law firms guilty of perceived offenses with no hearing or trial. The court does not directly address the issue since the plaintiffs did not present the issue as a claim. But, if Congress cannot pass a bill of attainder and if the President must enforce the laws passed by Congress, it would seem that neither may the President engage in bills of attainder.

In the end, the court was forced to do a lot of research and draft a book-length decision, but in the end, this was an easy decision for the Judge. And, I have to ask, what lawyer would accept defending such a case?

It is just totally weird that the Trump administration is targeting major law firms. I wrote about that odd new practice here. Pres. Trump has now targeted a handful of law firms. Two of those firms, Perkins Coie and Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, have filed lawsuits seeking protection from these strange Executive Orders. Not surprisingly, the Federal judges hearing those matters are very skeptical about the President’s EOs. U.S. DistrictJudge Beryl Howell asked DOJ in one hearing:

“Is this a throwback to the McCarthy era, the Red Scare era?” 

One of the acts of retribution taken by those EO’s is suspension of security clearances. The EO’s generally suspend the security clearance for 2,000 attorneys due to the lawful actions of one person. In one hearing, Judge Howell asked the question – after reviewing a Declaration from a former Department of Defense official who oversaw security clearances. That DOD official noted that a blanket suspension of clearances “harkens” back to the days of the Red Scare when such actions were taken. The official was likely explaining that lifting clearances for hundreds of lawyers at a time is just very odd.

In a separate hearing U.S. District Judge Richard Leon, the DOJ lawyer argued that suspending security clearances is a valid exercise of the executive branch. Judge Leon, replied that it appeared to him to be “pretty clear” this was retaliation for free speech, not a valid executive function. See ABA Bar Journal report here. It is unusual for a Federal Judge to make such clear remarks during the hearing. That suggests it is indeed clear these Eos amount to retaliation.

The Above the Law blog has created a BigLaw Spine Index to track how the big firms are responding to Pres. Trump’s unheard of EOs. See that Index here.

There are many pitfalls with forced arbitration. Georgia and John McGinty of New Jersey ran into one of those harsh pitfalls. The couple was injured in a crash of an Uber car. They sustained rib and spine fractures in March, 2022. Mrs. McGinty had lumbar and spine fractures. She had many surgeries and was unable to work for more than a year. Mr. McGinty had fractures in his left arm and wrist. He still has not regained complete use of his left wrist. Mr. McGinty said they are in constant pain every day.

But, in January, 2022, two months before the Uber collision, the McGinty’s daughter ordered pizza using Uber Eats. Uber claims someone – perhaps the daughter – checked the box, “I have reviewed and agree to the Terms of Use.” The McGinty’s say their daughter checked the box, even though it was Mrs. McGinty’s Uber Eats account.

Permission

The lower court denied Uber’s motion to force the McGinty’s claim into arbitration. That court said the Terms of Use did not clearly distinguish between court and arbitration. But, on appeal, the court of appeals sided with Uber. The higher court said Mrs. McGinty gave her daughter permission to sign for her when she handed the daughter the phone. It said the agreement did not need to explicitly describe the difference between court and arbitration.

It is a strange decision, holding that an agreement not directly tied to the automobile crash in March had some link to ordering pizza during the prior January. Too, it is rare indeed that a 12 year old daughter could sign a binding agreement. The McGintys plan to appeal. But, the appellate decision was unanimous. See the New York Times report here for more information. Forced arbitration is an insidious and persistent intrusion on a person’s right to seek just compensation for harm sustained.

It is a strange world indeed in which we find ourselves. The Department of Justice, once the exemplar for competence and professionalism, now hires lawyers to political posts who do not respect the courts. At a recent hearing before Judge Paula Xinis regarding Kilmar Abrego Garcia, the DOJ attorney sat while speaking to the Judge. It boggles the mind that any lawyer would sit while addressing any judge. But, for a DOJ lawyer to speak on weighty matters to a U.S. District Court judge while remaining seated is unfathomable. Federal court is infamous for requiring lawyers to use the lectern when speaking to the judge, to a witness, to anyone.

Drew Ensign is a political appointee to DOJ. He has replaced Erez Reuveni on the Abrego Garcia case. Reuveni formerly served as the chief Immigration attorney for DOJ. Mr. Reuveni admitted to shortcomings in his case and was fired for it. Now, we get Mr. Ensign – who sits while speaking to a U.S. District Judge. See CNN news report here.

Disrespect

Tired of this constant disrespect for trial judges, the Fourth Circuit court of Appeals has issued a stunning decision regarding the Abrego Garcia case. In a unanimous opinion, the Fourth Circuit rightly expresses concern about the “constant intimations of illegitimacy” cast by U.S. government officials toward Judges. “The Judiciary will lose much from a public perception of its lawlessness and all of its attendant contagions,” warned the Fourth Circuit. The opinion even describes Judge Xinis as a “fine district judge.” It is very rare for a court of appeals to praise a lower court judge. The court of appeals is clearly trying to bolster her status in the eyes of a Department of Justice and government officials who do not respect the judiciary.

Stashed Away

The Fourth Circuit, one of the more conservative courts of appeals in the country, is very concerned about the Abrego Garcia case. The court notes early in the decision:

“It is difficult in some cases to get to the very heart of the matter. But in this case it is not hard at all. The government is asserting its right to stash away residents of this country in foreign prisons without the semblance of due process that is the foundation of our constitutional order.”

The panel of three judges then notes the government then claims it can do nothing because it no longer has custody of the resident. The court is appalled: “This should be shocking not only to judges, but to the intuitive sense of liberty that Americans far removed from courthouses still hold dear.”

The court acknowledges that Mr. Abrego Garcia might be a member of the gang, MS-13. But, adds the court, perhaps he is not. In any event, he is entitled to some process before making such a finding. The court recalls the example of Pres. Eisenhower who was also called on to enforce a court decision with which he did not entirely agree. Regarding the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education II, Pres. Eisenhower said he would enforce the decision. For a President to do otherwise would invite chaos. The court quoted the late President: “Unless the President did so, anarchy would result.”

The court castigated the Department’s interpretation of the Supreme Court’s order to “facilitate” the return of Mr. Abrego Garcia. The word “facilitate” is an active verb, not passive. Simply agreeing not to oppose the possible return of Mr. Abrego Garcia is not a “felicitation,” said the court.

It would reduce the rule of law to lawlessness and tarnish the very values for which Americans of diverse views and persuasions have always stood.

These are strong words indeed for a court of appeals, more accustomed to scholarly consideration of weighty, but dry issues. Indeed, for the court to issue a decision within just a couple of weeks is exceedingly unusual. In my last appeal to the Fifth Circuit, it took about a year for the court to issue its decision. The words, actions and lack of respect by U.S. government officials – not to mention its courtroom advocates – will only “facilitate” further drama and strong language from many courts. See the decision in Garcia v. Noem, No. 25-1404 (4th Cir. April 17, 2025) here.

In an April 7 per curiam decision, the U.S. Supreme Court said detainees seeking to challenge their detention under the 1798 Alien Enemies Act must submit a petition for habeas corpus in the jurisdiction in which they are being held. That decision essentially overturns Judge Boasberg’s ruling that the proper venue was Washington, D.C, where the agencies are headquartered. Per curiam opinions are generally opinions which the court considers to be simple, obvious, and which do not need lengthy, complicated explanations. They are so simple that no single judge needs to sign the opinion.

All nine justices agreed on that discrete point regarding the need for due process. But, they disagreed on other issues. All nine justices agreed that the detainees are entitled to notice and due process before being deported. That was a clear rebuke to the Department of Justice.

“To the extent the government removes even one individual without affording him notice and a meaningful opportunity to file and pursue habeas relief, it does so in direct contravention of an edict by the United States Supreme Court,” Sotomayor said in her opinion.

The court did not address the underlying issue, whether the Federal government can use the nineteenth century Alien Enemies Act to deport the suspected gang members.

Habeas Corpus

Barrett, Kagan and Jackson also joined another portion of Sotomayor’s opinion which questioned the majority opinion which said the detainees needed to file a petition for habeas corpus. That is a “thorny” question, said the dissent. That is, these four justices would argue something more robust than a simple habeas corps petition would be needed. That thorny question will certainly be re-visited in full when the case is appealed on the full merits. A habeas corpus petition is a very brief motion which calls on the court to explain why a person is being held. A habeas corpus petition does not address the correctness of holding someone – it simply asks for the basis.

The Emergency Docket

In a separate dissent, Justice Jackson decried the “fly-by-night” approach to the work of the highest court in the land. She meant that resolving difficult issues this early in the process is problematic. The issues have not yet had time to develop. Justice Jackson is objecting to the majority which even accepted the government’s request for an emergency appeal. See ABA Bar Journal report here. See the court’s per curiam opinion here.