A request for accommodation need not mention any specific words, so long as the request puts the employer on notice that an accommodation is needed. Indeed, if an impairment is obvious, caselaw does not require the person to actually request the accommodation. See Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, 531 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir.2008); McElwee v. Cnty. Of Orange, 700 F.3d 635, 642 (2d Cir. 2012). Generally, a doctor’s note or medical restriction of some sort suffices to serve as a request for an accommodation. See, e.g., Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer’s Research Center, 155 F.3d 775, 784 (6th Cir. 1998) (doctor’s note was sufficient, and court would infer that employer read it because it was located in plaintiff’s personnel file). So, the decision in Acker v. General Motors, No. 16-11174 (5th Cir. 4/10/2017) is surprising. That decision found that FMLA leave cannot constitute a request for an accommodation.
Lonny Acker worked for GM for over ten years. He was diagnosed with anemia, which causes blackouts, heart palpitations and severe fatigue. It can cause dizziness for prolonged periods. He requested and received intermittent FMLA leave. He was out on leave some 30 times over a six month time period. Five absences were considered unexcused. Mr. Acker testified he called in for those absences, but the phone records for his phone did not support that claim. He was suspended twice, once for 30 days. He then filed suit for the unpaid suspensions.
The employer moved for summary judgment. The lower court granted the motion for summary judgment, which the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court insisted that Mr. Acker cannot create a factual issue based solely on his deposition testimony, since his testimony conflicted with the phone records. That is unfortunate. GM accused him not of not calling in but of not calling in to the right places. He allegedly called the absence phone line but did not call the Benefits & Services phone line, according to GM. Five of the 30 absences were in question. Plaintiff Acker insisted he called in correctly on those days. But, said, the court, his testimony was not enough to avoid summary judgment. So, the court affirmed summary judgment regarding his FMLA interference claim.
The employee then argued that his FMLA leave should constitute a request for an accommodation. He admitted that his FMLA request did not follow the GM procedure for seeking a request for an accommodation under the ADA and the state equivalent of the ADA. Mr. Acker argued that generally, a request for medical leave is generally also a request for an accommodation. No, said the court. The panel stated that FMLA and the ADA are two different statutes. But, of course, the two are different statutes. That the two are different statutes wth different definitions does not explain why a request for medical leave does not serve as a request for an accommodation.
The court then added that “FMLA leave is not a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.” It cited Harville v. Texas A&M Univ., 833 F.Supp.2d 645, 661 (S,D.Tex. 2011), which cited Trevino v. United Parcel Service, No. 3:08-CV-889-B, 2009 WL 3423039 *12 (N.D. Tex. 10/23/2009). The court in Trevino does indeed find that a request for leave under the FMLA does not serve as a request for leave as an accommodation. But, it does not explain why. It does cite to Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 101 (1st Cir. 2001). But, the Navarro decision nowhere finds that in all cases a request for medical leave under the FMLA can never serve as a request for accommodation. Instead, it answered a different question, whether a daughter’s illness met the definition of disability under the FMLA. If the daughter’s diagnosis satisfied the definition of disability under the FMLA, then the mother was entitled to leave to care for her daughter. The question of whether a person asking for medical leave under the FMLA could be seen as also requesting leave as an accommodation was never addressed.
The salient question which the Fifth Circuit opinion did not address was whether the leave request under the FMLA satisfied the requirements for requesting leave under the ADA? The caselaw states in clear terms that no “magic” words are necessary to request leave as an accommodation. There appears to be no reason why a request for leave under the FMLA cannot serve as a request for leave as an accommodation, assuming the normal ADA factors are also satisfied. That is, so long as the employee places the employer on notice that the leave may apply to a qualified disability, then yes, a request for leave under the FMLA ought to serve as a request for leave as an accommodation. One can conclude from the court decisions, however, that judges prefer to keep legal matters tidy and not allow things to “slop” over from one statute to another……..
See the decision in Acker v. General Motors here.